should not be at the expense of the old, and sounds a salutary warning about the dangers of 'overstretch' in cyber-space. Even the United States cannot talk, or twitter, to everyone all the time.

Being good communicators as well as committed to their craft, old USIA hands have acted as a vocal lobby for public diplomacy since the demise of the USIA itself in 1999 (when its functions were absorbed into the State Department), and more particularly in the aftermath of 9/11, when the Bush administration's outreach to the Muslim world was, by common consent, lacklustre. Their criticisms have force but contain a hint of nostalgia for the glory days of the USIA during the Cold War when it was in the forefront of the 'war of ideas' against communism. (A useful antidote to such self-satisfaction is Nicholas Cull's masterly account, *The Cold War and* the *United States Information Agency*, Cambridge University Press, 2008). But, that said, it is hard to quarrel with the timeless principles that Rugh and his fellow practitioners embody: that nothing beats local knowledge; that the internet is no substitute for face-to-face encounter; and that, in the end, good diplomacy is the product of good policy.

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Conflict, security and defence

Terror in our time. By Ken Booth and Tim Dunne. Basingstoke: Routledge. 2011. 240pp. Pb.: £15.99. ISBN 978 0 41567 831 5.

As a collection of extended essays, this co-authored book offers wise insights on terrorism and security since the 9/11 Al-Qaeda attacks. The calm analysis and broad reach of the book combine to generate a clear voice within a cacophonous field. Best suited to the intelligent generalist or upper-level undergraduate, *Terror in our time* provides a refreshing overview of world events related to the evolution of terrorism and counterterrorism over the past ten years.

The book's central argument holds that the current world order produces terrorism, so our objective should be to move towards a new global system where terrorism lacks legitimacy. By 'world order', Ken Booth and Tim Dunne mean 'the interplay of dominant ideas, patterns of violence, disparities of local and global power, and institutional adaptation' (p. 10). Within this sweeping framework, the authors seek to challenge how the reader thinks about the problem. They succeed.

There are numerous thought-provoking nuggets. In the opening two chapters, the book asserts that deaths caused by non-state terrorism have gained in proportion to those resulting from state violence. Mass casualty terrorism 'has become a more prominent feature of world politics, and since 9/11 has accounted for higher terror deaths than terror practices performed by governments' (p. 21). The authors assert that between 2001 and 2008, non-state terrorism produced five times the death toll of state terror. (A statistical appendix, drawn from publicly available online databases, supports these claims.) If the authors are correct, either governments are modulating state violence against their own populations or non-state terrorist groups are gaining importance. Or it was an anomalous period. It is too early to say whether this represents a trend.

Whatever the explanation, the implications of increasing non-state lethality are worth pondering, as the Syrian government mows down its own citizens, NATO intervenes to protect Libyan civilians, and the legitimate use of force by governments (especially those in the Middle East and Africa) seems more contested than ever. When non-state becomes

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state, casualty figures become harder to distinguish. What will the trajectory of state and non-state global violence be? At any rate, while state terror is included in the definition of 'terrorism' in chapter two, the authors limit their scope to 'political violence as practised by substate groups and networks' for the remainder of the book.

A particularly strong section appears in chapter three, 'Dangers', with a judicious discussion of the concept of risk. Understanding the relationship between risk and terrorism is not as simple as comparing an individual's chance of slipping in the bathtub, dying in a car accident or being targeted by a terrorist attack, they argue. Because terrorism aims to influence those who are watching, terrorist attacks affect *societies* not just the individuals who are killed. Fear is a powerful emotion that can drive populations to passionate response. When terrorist attacks hit vulnerable points, small events have disproportionate consequences. As the authors put it, 'To say that "only 3,000" were killed on 9/11 is as unhelpful from the perspective of international politics as saying that only two people were assassinated in Sarajevo on 28 June 1914' (p. 34).

Essays on Al-Qaeda's evolution (chapter four: 'Base'), the relationship between religion and terrorism (chapter five: 'Evil'), the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (chapter six: 'Wars'), the US response (chapter seven: 'America'), the Muslim *ummah* (chapter eight: 'Islam'), and the future of the state (chapter nine: 'Governance') follow in quick succession. Each offers a balanced perspective, including perceptive analyses of the war in Afghanistan and the status of Al-Qaeda. Chapter ten beautifully challenges the superficial belief that democracy is the answer to terrorism, pointing out that the two are intertwined. Here as elsewhere, the authors shy away from easy answers to complex questions.

The final pages revisit theory, admitting that 'all previous world orders have been subject to the sometimes deadly consequences of organised violence, whether public (states) or private (be they revolutionaries, insurgents, pirates, or terrorists)' yet urging governments to think in terms of a 'world order strategy' not conducive to terrorism (pp. 170, 173). The elements of such a strategy might include reasoning together across traditional boundaries, building a more just order, avoiding inflammatory language (for instance the 'war on terror'), and considering talks with those who use terrorism, the authors suggest. More practically, policy-makers should employ the full range of techniques used in Northern Ireland—'secret talks here, negotiations there, a cease-fire, a treaty, some disarming, an official apology', etc. (p. 180)—to bring about the 'endings' of terrorist campaigns. 'Terror in our time is not over', they conclude, 'but a time of endings is a real possibility if the pathologies of world order are reduced'.

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The gun: the AK-47 and the evolution of war. By Christopher John Chivers. London: Allen Lane. 2010. 480pp. Index. £25.00. ISBN 978 0 71399 837 5.

The scientific way of warfare: order and chaos on the battlefields of modernity. By Antoine J. Bousquet. London: Hurst. 2009. 265pp. Index. Pb.: £15.99. ISBN 978 1 85065 945 7.

For those interested in the evolution of world politics and the place of violence within it, these contrasting books tell stimulating stories about a broad area of common concern. They are both about the evolution of warfare, with one (*The scientific way of warfare*) addressing the subject from a relatively abstract level, involving scientific discourse and what Antoine Bousquet identifies as a guiding metaphor, while the other (*The gun*) focuses on the evolution of the rapid-fire gun in land warfare from the perspectives of the users and the developers.

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