

Good citizen Europe

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History has not looked kindly on empires, past or present. With each uncertain step towards further integration and with the memories of imperial identities fading, it is 'as if Europe as a whole is being given a second chance'.¹ While the *telos* of this project is unknown, it is possible to discern an emergent European internationalism in which social democratic values are entrenched within its community and extended beyond its borders. The key identifying marker of this post-national polity is the extension of citizenship to 493 million inhabitants. Can this idea of citizenship, cut loose from its national-territorial anchorage, be deployed to guide an enlightened European foreign policy?

Internationalism, of which good international citizenship is a variant, has long been associated with the foreign policies of a select group of countries that strove for 'purposes beyond themselves'.² Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden have been held up as exemplars given their commitment to progressivist goals such as meeting the UN's target for overseas development aid and making significant contributions to international peacekeeping missions. In the 1990s, academic thinking on good international citizenship attached itself in particular to the middle power activism evident in the foreign policies of Australia (under the stewardship of Gareth Evans) and Canada (under the stewardship of Lloyd Axworthy).³ More controversially, the start of the Blair years in Britain prompted

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¹ So argues Jürgen Habermas, in 'Citizenship and national identity: some reflections on the future of Europe', *Praxis International* 12: 1, 1992, p. 1.

² Hedley Bull, *Justice in international relations*, The Hagey Lectures (Waterloo, Ont.: University of Waterloo, 1993), p. 13. The relationship between good international citizenship and internationalism is explored in Peter Lawler, 'The good state: in praise of "classical" internationalism', *Review of International Studies* 31: 3, 2005; see esp, pp. 432–3. Lawler rightly criticizes many International Relations theorists for neglecting 'this long-standing middle ground' of internationalism (p. 432).

³ The key text in the Australian case is Paul Keal, ed., *Ethics and foreign policy* (St Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1992). For an insight into Canada's ethical foreign policy, see Lloyd Axworthy, 'Canada and anti-personnel landmines', in Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield and Tim Dunne, eds, *Foreign policy: theories, actors, cases* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2008).

an assessment of whether a former colonial power could reconstitute itself as a 'good citizen'.⁴ What makes Europe a particularly intriguing case for analysis is the fusion of cosmopolitan ideas of universal rights with an emerging institutional capacity to protect those rights. The deepening of shared values within the EU does not necessarily mean, however, that cosmopolitan ideas will inform its future international public policy.⁵

Good international citizenship sets out a different role for Europe from either of the historic alternatives, namely that the Union should either be a uniquely 'civilian power' or else develop into a good old-fashioned great power. The civilian power narrative remains important in the self-understandings of the EU's role and is frequently referred to by practitioners.⁶ It suffers, however, from two defects. In the first instance, in so far as the term 'civilian' is the opposite of 'military', the EU is properly civilian in neither its instruments nor its goals.⁷ The second defect is more subtle. By implying a uniquely non-military identity, supporters of the civilian power argument are claiming a form of exceptionalism that antagonizes moderate voices in the United States. It also, curiously, appears to acquiesce in the neo-conservative view that Europeans are not prepared to stand up for what they believe in.⁸ Given the proximity of the so-called 'arc of crisis' to Europe's borders, clinging on to an identity that is pacific might be both unwise and unjust.⁹ The goals of order and justice in global international society require that Europe play a more assertive role: there is empirical evidence that international public opinion believes the EU can and should take a positive part in world affairs.¹⁰

Becoming a regional engine for the world common good requires both greater self-reliance in the provision of its own security as well as a capacity to deploy 'forces for good' rapidly to prevent or eradicate crises out of area. Neither of these demands comes close to implying, as realists do, that the EU is a great power in waiting. Such views overstate the importance of military capability as an instrument of politics. In the twenty-first century, the vectors of soft power and legitimate power are far more effective levers for obtaining outcomes than the threat or use of force (which is costly and seldom successful, as the US-led coalition of the

⁴ Nicholas J. Wheeler and Tim Dunne, 'Good international citizenship: a third way for British foreign policy', *International Affairs* 74: 4, 1998, pp. 847–70; Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler, 'Blair's Britain: a force for good in the world?', in Margot Light and Karen Smith, eds, *Ethics and foreign policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 167–84.

⁵ Although this article does not entirely eschew the category of 'foreign policy', it should be noted that the domestic–international divide, on which the idea of 'foreign' is premised, is precisely what the EU's identity challenges. 'International public policy' is a more accurate descriptor of EU action in world politics.

⁶ Henrik Larson, 'A global military actor?', *Cooperation and Conflict* 37: 3, 2002, pp. 283–302.

⁷ For a full working-out of this argument, see Karen E. Smith, 'Still "civilian power" EU', European Foreign Policy Unit working paper, 2005/1, p. 10. She concludes that 'civilian power EU is definitely dead' (p. 12).

⁸ Such views are regularly voiced by the neo-con newspaper *The Weekly Standard*.

⁹ In Manners's and Whitman's words, 'the construction and representation of the EU as a pacific social grouping is widely accepted': 'The "difference engine": constructing and representing the international identity of the European Union', *Journal of European Public Policy* 10: 3, 1998, p. 398.

¹⁰ Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard, 'The world's choice: super, soft, or herbivorous power', *Open Democracy*, <http://www.opendemocracy.net>, accessed 6 Nov. 2007. The project, conducted by Voice of the People for the European Council on Foreign Relations, draws on responses from over 57,000 respondents in 52 countries. Krastev and Leonard report that the data (released 25 Oct. 2007) show that the EU is unique among great powers in that 'more people across all continents want to see its power increase than decrease'.

willing found out to in Iraq). Perhaps a more significant weakness with the ‘great power in waiting’ thesis is that it reveals a one-dimensional form of thinking. It is time we discarded the view that there is only one logic of action in international relations, namely that of self-help. Regional integration in Europe has created rules and institutions that have transformed the meaning of sovereignty. To regard this process as one that will end when Europe acquires a single identity, coupled with a monopoly over the legitimate means of violence, is misguided. A United States of Europe that articulates a militarized hegemonic identity, in a manner similar to the Bush doctrine, would be a Europe that had passed up its historic second chance.

Between the realist orbit of Mars and the idealist paradise on Venus—to use Kagan’s contrived distinction¹¹—lies an alternative that resists the pull of power politics and the disabling purity of exceptionalism. Europe does not need to accept a choice: *either* becoming a proto-superpower *or* retreating to EUtopia. There is a moral middle way to be found. For Europe to play a positive role in world affairs it needs *both* to develop and integrate its military capability *and* to deepen its commitment to cosmopolitan values which have shaped its identity. The purpose of this article is to lend a voice to those seeking to find this middle ground. It does so by building and refining the idea of ‘good international citizenship’, which hitherto has been applied only to small and middle powers with a liberal or social democratic ethos.

An account of good international citizenship needs to be located in the broader conception of international society out of which it evolved. In its contemporary usage, international society refers to the interstate order in which the members recognize each other, share common interests, and agree to be bound by certain minimal rules of coexistence. With the process of decolonization being virtually complete, international society is global in scope. What we find in the EU, as Diez and Whitman argue, is that ‘this society is particularly well developed’ in so far as the set of common rules and values ‘is particularly dense’.¹²

The first part of the article unpacks in more detail what is at stake in the claim that Europe forms a mature regional international society that has gone beyond the hard and exclusive conception of sovereignty found in the Westphalian model of international relations.¹³ The clearest identifier of this transition is the Europeanization of citizenship. By contrast, the global international society is a ‘thin’ normative order. Its institutional architecture was evolved by sovereign states and for sovereign states. This does not prevent high levels of cooperation, particularly on technical issues where the stakes are low but the returns are high. When it comes to major strategic questions, however, the global international society has only limited

¹¹ Robert Kagan, *Of paradise and power: America and Europe in the new world order* (New York: Knopf, 2003). Sophisticated treatments of the ethics of realism and cosmopolitanism are set out elsewhere in this issue of *International Affairs* by Adrian Hyde-Price and Ian Manners respectively.

¹² Thomas Diez and Richard Whitman, ‘Analysing European integration: reflecting on the English School—scenarios for an encounter’, *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40: 1, 2002, p. 45.

¹³ The EU should be regarded as being the core of European international society; many of its values and aspects of its identity belong to the overlapping regimes of an older and wider European civilization, including the Council of Europe and the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (though the latter’s membership is both Eurasian and transatlantic).

agency and is vulnerable to its members articulating different interests and values. The current standoff between the West and Iran is a case in point: both protagonists claim with some justification that justice and security are on their side.

Treating the EU as a regional international society embedded in a wider global society has considerable merit when thinking about the EU as an international actor, as I argue in the second part of the article.¹⁴ The payoff lies in particular with the realization that the coexistence and interplay of two international societies requires accepting that actors will pursue *different* policies dependent on the context. The claim here is that the extent to which it is possible for Europe to succeed as a good citizen externally depends on its ability to negotiate between the normative orders coexisting *within* the EU and beyond it.

In the third and final part of the article I argue that there is no single strategy which can be deployed by actors seeking to be good citizens. There may be occasions when security concerns are uppermost and considerations of order are privileged over the value of justice. Such a position can be reconciled with good citizenship provided it can be demonstrated that the prevailing institutional order is not ready to accept the imposition of universal principles. There are, however, limits on the kinds of conduct that are tolerable. What is *not* permitted is for narrow conceptions of self-interest to prevail over a particular moral commitment when the latter has acquired a high degree of legitimacy. For example, if the rights of a minority are being violently denied by a government close to Europe, then there is a duty to act in solidarity with the victims even if this requires the deployment of military force. In contrast to what happened with the Kosovan Albanians, next time a neighbouring community dials the EU's emergency number, they must not be put on hold until the United States is ready to respond.

Statist and transnational conceptions of citizenship

The phrase 'good international citizenship' was used by Gareth Evans, Australian foreign minister from 1988 to 1996, as a way of signalling that, in practice, foreign policy had to blend aspects of realism with idealism. Not surprisingly, such a suggestive synthesis of historically opposed ideas was in need of further conceptual refinement. The first sustained attempt to translate good international citizenship into a foreign policy doctrine was made by Andrew Linklater. Drawing on the work of political and social theorists, he argued that citizenship was a practice that had progressive possibilities when transposed to the international realm. Why is citizenship an appropriate analogy to guide an actor's international public policy? Is it possible to export an expression of individual rights and duties from

¹⁴ It is important to note the limited scope of my argument. It takes the integration process as a given rather than addressing how it came about and what implications this unfinished journey has for EU international public policy. I also leave untouched the complex process of institutional convergence with regard to 'external' policy formulation. For detailed consideration, see Karen E. Smith, *European Union foreign policy in a changing world* (Cambridge: Polity, 2003); Michael Smith, 'Toward a theory of EU foreign policy-making', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 11: 4, 2004, pp. 740–58; Christopher Hill, 'Renationalizing or regrouping? EU foreign policy since 11 September 2001', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 42: 1, 2004, pp. 143–63.

a bounded polity to the global order? The way to begin answering these questions is by considering in more depth the meaning of citizenship.

From the French Revolution until the end of the Second World War, citizenship was primarily a political category. It was a juridical way of assigning a person to a state: in Habermas's words, 'this definition of membership serves, along with the territorial demarcation of the country's borders, the purpose of a social delimitation of the state'.¹⁵ In the course of the nineteenth century, liberal states reconstituted citizenship to mean not just membership of a state-based community but also the right to political participation. Citizenship came to include the right to vote and the right to stand for office. Later, in the post-1945 world, social rights were accorded to citizens on an equal basis: the right to health care, education and a degree of economic security.

The conception of citizenship developed in social democratic states in the late twentieth century had become much more than just a set of passive entitlements that individuals claimed from their state. Good citizens were those who took their duties seriously, who supported progressive taxation to assist the more vulnerable in society, and who took seriously the demand that they should participate in the public sphere (even if this was limited to voting in elections). Active citizenship invoked not only an ethic of care but also an enlarged public sphere with more inclusive and responsive forms of deliberation.

In more recent times, cosmopolitan theorists have sought to develop a language of world citizenship. This is not incompatible, they argue, with the coexistence of national and regional identities. As Derek Heater argues, 'from ancient Greece to Enlightenment Europe, citizenship, nationhood and world citizenship were held in mutual compatibility'.¹⁶ Even if this argument is overstated, what is uncontested is the fact that the development of the modern state interpreted the rights and duties of citizenship in exclusivist terms.

Heater's injunction to return to ancient Greek thought on citizenship resonates with a dimension of the concept that has been left out of the literature, and yet is prescient for thinking about the EU's role in world affairs. Historically, good citizens were regarded as patriots who had a duty to lay down their lives for the security and liberty of the state. Such a belief that patriotism is the foundation for, and ultimate protector of, democracy is a recurring theme in the western imaginary; but it is one that Europe appears to have left behind. A good European today is a civilian and not a soldier, one who is not required to sacrifice their life for the community but is expected to orient their patriotism to the constitutional principles of the Union.¹⁷

The 1993 Maastricht Treaty codified a conception of citizenship that deviated from the Westphalian fusion of exclusive citizenship with state-based forms of authority. After Maastricht, EU citizens were permitted the right to reside in the territory of another member state, and the right to protection by the diplomatic

¹⁵ Habermas, 'Citizenship and national identity', p. 4.

¹⁶ Derek Heater, 'Does cosmopolitan thinking have a future?', *Review of International Studies* 26: 5, 2000, p. 184.

¹⁷ Margaret Canovan, 'Patriotism is not enough', *British Journal of Political Science* 30: 3, 2000, pp. 413–32.

or consular authorities of other member states when in a third country. Alongside these rights of hospitality are the political rights to vote and stand for office in local and regional elections.

The Europeanization of citizenship does not replace civic attachment to the state; rather, it should be seen as supplementary. After all, a prior condition for European citizenship is that 'one must first hold nationality of a member state'.¹⁸ It is also true to say that EU citizenship is underdeveloped in comparison with the depth of citizenship rights enshrined in the constitutions of the member states.¹⁹ Duties are also consigned to the margins. As Jennifer Welsh asks, 'what corresponding duties or obligations do European citizens have? To pay taxes? To subsidise the development of poorer areas? To offer service in a European defence force?'²⁰

Though highly significant for the development of a European identity, the 'dual citizenship' model illustrates a much bigger dilemma within the Union. Attempts to develop a common European position on international security issues are continually hampered by the same duality. As we saw over Iraq, member states—particularly the 'big three', France, Germany and Britain—operate with distinct views on how to respond to potential threats and what to do about American unilateralism. This tendency to break out of a common foreign and security policy is an ever-present reminder that the process of Europeanization rests uneasily alongside a countervailing logic whereby states decide their own priorities.

The conditions of good international citizenship

Before an adequate analysis can begin as to whether Europe is a good citizen, it is necessary to consider the objection that collectivities do not possess agency (or the capacity to act). Refuting this objection is a precondition for thinking about the EU as a regional international society which is also a player in the wider society of states.

Agency in international society

The injunction that states must act as good international citizens presumes that it is meaningful to speak about the European Union as an 'actor' with certain responsibilities. While the question of the 'actorness' of the union has been discussed at great length by regional specialists, far less attention has been given to the meta-ethical considerations.²¹

¹⁸ The complex complementarity of EU constitutional principles set alongside those of the member states is set out in Richard Bellamy and Dario Castiglione, 'Between cosmopolis and community: three models of rights and democracy within the European Union', in Daniele Archibugi, David Held and Martin Köhler, eds, *Re-imagining political community* (Cambridge: Polity, 1998), pp. 152–78.

¹⁹ Andrew Linklater, 'Citizenship and sovereignty in the post-Westphalian European state', in Archibugi et al., *Re-imagining political community*, p. 130.

²⁰ Jennifer M. Welsh, *A 'People's' Europe: European citizenship and European identity* (Florence: European University Institute, 1993), p. 8.

²¹ Exceptions are Thomas Diez, 'International ethics and European integration: federal state or network horizon?', *Alternatives* 22: 3, pp. 287–312; Ian Manners, 'Normative power Europe: a contradiction in terms?', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40: 2, 2002, pp. 235–58.

A leading constructivist in International Relations has provided a persuasive argument that 'states are people too'.²² In doing so, he is invoking an analogy between natural persons and artificial beings that goes back at least as far as Hobbes. On what basis do such claims to 'actorness' rest? Surely it is difficult enough to imagine a complex entity like a state being regarded as a moral person without pushing the envelope further to encompass an institutional hybrid like the EU? It is not as though *all* collectivities are actors; we would exclude, for example, people on a Saturday afternoon walking around a busy inner-city shopping centre. Being a mere collective assembly of persons is different from being a group of individuals that have agency in a moral and political sense. The difference rests on the following two conditions: a group that is a moral agent possesses an identity that is more than an aggregate of the identities of its parts; and the collective agent has a decision-making capacity.²³

A sense of collective identity was apparent to practitioners in European international society from as early as the 1700s. At the Congress of Utrecht in 1712, called to consider the problem of the Habsburg succession, the British Secretary of State Lord Bolingbroke spoke of the constitution of Europe and 'the common cause of Europe'.²⁴

As for the EU today, it is beyond question that it has a 'decision-making capacity' in international public policy. The institutional order may be complex, there may be democratic deficits, there may be disagreements about competences, and so on, but there can be no serious objection to the claim that the EU makes decisions on a vast range of issues. Its collective presence as a contracting party to various international regimes testifies to its capacity to enter into relations with other international actors. That said, having agency does not mean that the union will be able to mobilize a common position at all times. Indeed, the likelihood of this occurring has been reduced by the process of enlargement to a more numerous group in which consensus is harder to achieve and where the gap between the more powerful and the weaker members (especially when it comes to military capability) is enormous.

The argument that the EU possesses a self-identity is further bolstered by the growing sense of community on the part of publics in the member states. In 1991, only 47 per cent of EU citizens said that they were 'fairly attached' or 'very attached' to Europe; by mid-2006 this figure was standing at 66 per cent.²⁵ To these rudimentary survey data it is important to add a narrative of cultural unity. Jürgen Habermas and the late Jacques Derrida have supplied a particularly persuasive case for what it is that we Europeans share:

²² Alexander Wendt, *Social theory of international politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 215–24.

²³ This argument is nicely set out in Toni Erskine, 'Assigning responsibilities to institutional moral agents: the case of states and quasi-states', *Ethics and International Affairs* 15: 2, 2001, pp. 69–72.

²⁴ Andreas Osiander, *The states system of Europe: peacemaking and the conditions of international stability* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. III.

²⁵ These data are taken from the European Commission's surveys. See 'Three decades of Eurobarometer: European integration as seen by public opinion in the member states 1974–2007', http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm, accessed 10 Sept. 2007.

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In European societies, secularization is relatively far advanced. Citizens here regard transgressions of the border between politics and religion with suspicion. Europeans have a relatively large amount of trust in the organizational and steering capacities of the state, while remaining sceptical toward the achievements of markets ... They maintain a preference for the welfare state's guarantees of social security and for regulations on the basis of solidarity. The threshold of tolerance for the use of force against persons lies relatively low. The desire for a multilateral and legally regulated international order is connected with the hope for an effective global domestic policy, within the framework of the United Nations.²⁶

Having established a conceptual basis for claiming the EU is a moral and political agent, we face the fundamental question: *how* should it act? This requires a consideration of the wider complex of rules and resources that constitute the structure of international society.²⁷ Unlike the EU, the international society of 193 member states does not possess a single authoritative decision-making capacity and therefore lacks agency in a direct sense. It does, however, constitute a structure which nudges (and sometimes shoves) states to adopt certain policy formulations. By this logic, good international citizens must moderate their actions in the light of the normative logics prevailing in the wider society of states. The costs of getting this wrong are considerable, both to Europe's standing in the world and to international order.

The structure of international societies

Hedley Bull argued that all societies seek to maintain order.²⁸ They do so by achieving certain primary goals such as security from violence, the sanctity of promises and respect for property. In the absence of these conditions, normal life is impossible. Transposing these goals to the society formed by sovereign states, Bull argued that the three basic purposes of international society were security against interstate violence, observance of international agreements and respect for sovereignty. The generalized adherence to these rules indicates a progressive movement away from a Westphalian world in which the state exerts monopoly powers and where wars of conquest are routine rather than exceptional.

In the classical age of the European states system (1648–1914), European international society developed institutions to realize these primary goals. Through the balance of power, practitioners sought to limit the possibility of general and convulsive wars of conquest. The system of diplomacy was maintained by a complex set of customary rules which were generally respected. Sovereignty was the master institution of the European order. It identified the membership—and by implication the excluded—and signalled a prohibition on intervention.

²⁶ Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida, 'February 15, or what binds Europe together', *Constellations* 10: 3, 2003, p. 295.

²⁷ In embedding foreign policy action in a conceptualization of structure and agency, this argument parallels that found in Christopher Hill, *The changing politics of foreign policy* (Basingstoke: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2003).

²⁸ Hedley Bull, *The anarchical society: a study of order in world politics* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1977), esp. pp. 23–52.

This pluralist order of classical European international society sought to contain violence within its orbit, not to eradicate it. In the post-1945 world, despite the fact that the same pluralist rules of coexistence became embedded in the UN order, European states embarked on the development of a set of rules and institutions which were incompatible with pluralism.

For critics of pluralism, a conception of international society which embodied the principles of sovereignty, non-intervention and restraints on violence was flawed for three reasons: first, by seeking to provide a justification for war, defenders of an interstate order were guilty of lacking normative ambition;²⁹ second, the rule of respecting the absolute jurisdiction of each state over its citizens enabled egregious human rights violators to go unpunished; third, great powers frequently sacrificed the sovereignty of other states when they believed their vital interests were at stake or when the balance of power required recalibration (as was claimed by the superpowers during the Cold War).

Pluralism is a thin conception of international society because it maintains that cultural diversity is a practical and moral barrier to the pursuit of collective moral purposes other than maintaining order. Yet to diplomats and state leaders in the early post-1945 period, the pluralist rules of mutual respect, non-intervention and the control and regulation of violence looked anything but under-ambitious. Compared with a realist view of the world—particularly the realism of the late nineteenth century, which had become infused with nationalism: an explosive combination of ideas which brought the curtain down on European dominance of the international system—pluralism seemed like a civilizing force in world affairs.

The hope that institutions might moderate power politics is nicely captured by Martin Wight's words, written in the 1940s: 'powers will continue to seek security without reference to justice, and to preserve their vital interests irrespective of common interests, but in the fraction that they may be deflected lies the difference between the jungle and the traditions of Europe.'³⁰ Later, Wight set out in more detail what he meant by the traditions of Europe: an attachment to constitutionalism and the search for a golden mean. The forward momentum of EU integration has embodied both these principles.

While the dominant rules of the pluralist European international society were incorporated into the UN Charter, the Treaty of Rome set in motion the development of a regional international society built on solidarist principles. What does a solidarist international society entail? It was originally defined as the capacity to enforce the rules collectively, particularly in relation to those principles of justice such as human rights that had achieved widespread legitimacy within international society.³¹ It differs from pure cosmopolitanism in that it does not

²⁹ In Kant's words, defenders of the legitimacy of war such as Grotius, Pufendorf and Vattel were 'sorry comforters': Immanuel Kant, 'Perpetual peace: a philosophical sketch', in *Kant: political writings*, ed. Hans Reiss, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 103.

³⁰ Martin Wight, *Power politics* (London: RIIA, 1946), p. 68.

³¹ The classical statement of the meaning of solidarism can be found in Hedley Bull, 'The Grotian conception of international society', in Martin Wight and Hedley Bull, eds, *Diplomatic investigations: essays in the theory of international politics* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1966), p. 63.

demand the transcendence of an interstate order to achieve moral progress; in this respect solidarism is an *extension* of an international society, not its transformation. In a truly cosmopolitan order, there is no 'foreign' that requires actors to advance specific interests.

The EU is a solidarist international society in so far as its members are states that share high levels of common interests (trade, movement of peoples) and values. Convergence around core values is such that members have developed responsibilities for one another's security and have locked themselves into institutionally binding commitments in the area of human rights.³²

Where the EU can rely on legal institutions to uphold these rights, in the global society of states, the prevention of genocide and massive human rights violations depends on the will of individual sovereign states to enforce humanitarian law. As a consequence, there remains 'a colossal void on the international stage where all states hail the "responsibility to protect" but none are eager to exercise it'.³³

Despite having deeply shared values and strong institutions, the EU frequently finds itself in the same void when it comes to solidarity beyond its borders. This is often referred to as a capabilities–expectations gap. In other words, European publics might be mobilized to 'do something' about a humanitarian disaster, but the Union lacks the resources to match words with deeds. All too often the search for a common position on major foreign and security issues is compromised by lowest common denominator politics and the tendency to default from pre-commitments.³⁴

The presence of unilateralist tendencies in the foreign policy of leading member states is a significant constraint on developing practical and normative commitments commensurate with European aspirations to good international citizenship. This does not mean, however, that the sceptical realists have won the argument. A key dimension of good international citizenship is confronting moral limits as well as possibilities. In many cases it may be prudent *not* to act. International society, after all, has endured because of the presence of both prudence and moral obligation.³⁵

Pluralist and solidarist conceptions of good international citizenship

Early writings on good international citizenship tended to equate ethical statecraft with the pursuit of universal values of distributive justice and human rights protection. Given the relative optimism about the 'solidarist moment' at the end of

³² Buzan usefully disaggregates solidarism. The EU, he argues, is a 'convergence international society', which falls short of a 'confederative international society', which is the equivalent of a single political entity. See Barry Buzan, *From international to world society: English School theory and the structure of globalization* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), ch. 5.

³³ Samantha Power, 'The void: why the movement needs help', *New Republic*, 15 May 2006.

³⁴ The development of a European Security Strategy and the European Defence Agency can be seen as a direct response to the capabilities–expectations gap given the new threats and challenges of the post-9/11 world.

³⁵ Butterfield and Wight, *Diplomatic investigations*, p. iii.

the 1990s, this tendency to equate a solidarist conception of international citizenship with ethical statecraft per se was unsurprising. International society today presents us with a very different face. The 'war on terror' has revealed two threats to the primary goals of international society: a single superpower that no longer feels bound by the rules; and an emboldened network of jihadists who do not have a stake in the survival of international society.³⁶ What is 'good citizen Europe' to do in a world beyond its borders that is at best pluralist (where minimal rules of coexistence prevail) and at worst corresponds to a Hobbesian picture of a desperate struggle for survival? How far should solidarists apply their principles to states and regions that do not share their values?³⁷

To help answer these questions, I sketch out a series of maxims and key features related to solidarist and pluralist interpretations of international society (in that order). The list in each case is designed to be indicative rather than comprehensive. To begin with solidarism:

- *Sovereignty is conditional and multi-faceted.* Sovereign states are no longer the exclusive members of international society; membership now includes transnational non-governmental organizations as well as to regional international organizations and international organizations. In the twenty-first century, sovereignty is increasingly linked to notions of democracy and good governance. For international society as a whole, delivering basic rights to all—the right to security and subsistence—is a moral imperative for good international citizens. This cosmopolitan goal is prior to justice claims by sovereign states to exclusive legal and political determination.
- *Intervention for human rights protection is permissible.* Following on directly from the qualification of sovereignty, good international citizens recognize a qualified right of intervention to prevent or contain humanitarian catastrophes; such actions can be unilateral providing they are collectively legitimated.
- *Diplomacy must be multilateralized.* Although diplomacy is frequently circumscribed in terms of the number of participants, a vital principle is that the parties to the dialogue take into account the interests of all those who may be affected by the decision.
- *Harm avoidance.* International actors are responsible not just for acts of commission but also for those of omission; they cannot benefit from the indirect exploitation of others. In an environmental context, harm avoidance requires that the needs of future generations be taken into account. When assessing the call to arms in response to a humanitarian emergency, good international citizens must initially determine that they will not do more harm than good.³⁸

³⁶ These two threats to international society are considered in Tim Dunne, 'Society and hierarchy in International Relations', *International Relations* 17: 3, 2003, pp. 303–20. See also Richard Devetak, 'The gothic scene of international relations: ghosts, monsters, terror and the sublime after September 11', *Review of International Studies* 31: 4, 2005, pp. 621–43.

³⁷ Andrew Linklater and Hidemi Suganami, *The English School of International Relations: a contemporary reassessment* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 253.

³⁸ Recent contributions setting out duties in terms of 'harm conventions' include Andrew Linklater, 'Citizenship, humanity, and cosmopolitan harm conventions', *International Political Science Review / Revue internationale de science politique* 22: 3, 2001, pp. 261–77.

- *Cosmopolitan law-making.* Good international citizens must support attempts to build a system of law based on universal jurisdiction. This means that all individuals have a duty not to commit crimes against humanity. There is no place for the statist doctrine of sovereign immunity for government representatives beyond their term of office. The emergence of a transnational body of EU law to protect the rights of its citizens is an important indicator of a solidarist normative order. However, it is by itself incomplete without taking further measures 'to promote the ideals of cosmopolitan citizenship'.³⁹
- *Institutional reform.* Outside Europe, structures of international governance are state-based and the rules are frequently non-binding. These regimes invariably include inequalities that are not morally defended or open to renegotiation—such as permanent membership of the UN Security Council and the distinction between the nuclear 'haves' and the nuclear 'have-nots' which underpins the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Good citizen Europe should not turn its back on these pluralist regimes but should work patiently towards their reform. In terms of the enlargement of the EU, a good international citizenship informed by solidarism would look to an ever-widening circle of states to join its polity.

Extended consideration of each of these points is beyond the scope of this article; however, it is instructive to dwell on just one—the development of cosmopolitan law. In relation to human rights, the EU has an uneven record. Within the UN system for human rights promotion and protection, the effectiveness of the EU continues to be undermined by the difficulty of reaching a consensus on a common position. Attempts to persuade other states to adopt policies enhancing human rights is frequently hampered by the distractions of internal policy coordination.⁴⁰

A more optimistic conclusion can be drawn from Europe's role in establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC). The diplomacy of justice in relation to the ICC was thrown into tumult by the decision of the Bush administration to oppose ratification of the Rome Statute. The United States was worried that the principle of universal jurisdiction might enable its enemies to try to criminalize the conduct of American forces. If international society wants us to act as the world's enforcer, the Bush government argued, it should not make this job more difficult 'by subjecting its servicemembers to the jurisdiction of the ICC'.⁴¹ Europe, on this occasion, recognized that there was sufficient consensus in the world political system behind the idea of an independent institution for adjudicating criminal responsibility to proceed. Even though America was invoking important pluralist claims about the need for order, Europe judged that the risk to the primary goals of international society was negligible.

In an impressive recent study of the ICC, Jason Ralph argues that the Europeans 'were the driving force behind the successful establishment of the Court'.⁴² They

³⁹ Andrew Linklater, *The transformation of political community* (Cambridge: Polity, 1998), p. 204.

⁴⁰ Karen E. Smith, 'Speaking with one voice? European Union co-ordination on human rights issues at the United Nations', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 44: 1, 2006, pp. 113–37.

⁴¹ Jason Ralph, *Defending the society of states: why America opposes the International Criminal Court and its vision of world society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 152.

⁴² Ralph, *Defending*, p. 153.

were joined by a long list of allies—over 60—who coalesced in a Like Minded Group (LMG).⁴³ The convergence of EU member states around a policy of staunch support for the ICC continued after the Rome Statute was put up for ratification. In June 2001 the EU adopted a common position at a time when only 32 states had ratified the Rome Treaty, declaring that its principles were ‘fully in line with the principles and objectives of the Union’. It then engaged in a sustained diplomatic campaign to assist ratification,⁴⁴ in doing so setting on a course that led to frequent collisions with its transatlantic ally.

If the EU was right to pursue a solidarist-informed conception of good international citizenship in respect of the ICC, what barriers are there to adopting this strategy across the board? At the outset, advocates of the doctrine have consistently argued that the duties to enhance cosmopolitan goals are suspended if a state can reasonably argue that its ‘vital interests’ would thereby be put in jeopardy.⁴⁵ Below, I further develop this claim that a moral middle way allows for ‘dual’ standards in certain cases. These are doubly significant for a polity such as the EU where international public policy is frequently compromised by unilateralist positions adopted by leading member states.

What, then, are the features of pluralism which are consistent with good international citizenship? An indicative list includes the following six:

- *The resilience of sovereignty.* It remains the founding norm of international society—even the UN remains a fundamentally statist institution. Member states of the EU, especially France and the UK, will continue to articulate security strategies in ways that do not always accord with an EU position. Expecting policy convergence on issues such as the possession of nuclear weapons is likely to set back European defence cooperation. Instead, the Union should continue to permit a degree of self-determination in these areas of high politics, provided no member state acts in ways that undermine the rules and institutions of the UN order. Outside the EU, commitments to strong versions of the sovereignty doctrine prevail, particularly in Asia. When this doctrine is defended by stable but non-democratic states, the EU must engage in a dialogue that does not presume the superiority of a particular understanding of liberal universalism (what Europe called the ‘standard of civilization’ in the nineteenth century).
- *Non-intervention and the restraints on war.* States and other international political communities must respect restraints on their capacity to wage war (and on what is permissible during the conduct of war). This is particularly the case with regard to the prohibition on humanitarian intervention and wars of democratic regime change: such wars of choice are outlawed unless and until the legality and legitimacy of such a rule change have been incontrovertibly established. Any

⁴³ Australia chaired the group during the Rome conference itself. See Alex Bellamy and Marianne Hanson, ‘Justice beyond borders? Australia and the International Criminal Court’, *Australian Journal of Political Science* 56: 3, 2002, pp. 417–33.

⁴⁴ Precise measures are detailed in Ralph, *Defending*, p. 155.

⁴⁵ Andrew Linklater, ‘What is a good international citizen?’, in Keal, *Ethics*, pp. 21–43.

future EU preventive action, such as that envisaged in the European Security Strategy,⁴⁶ must be in strict compliance with the laws of war.

- *Preserving an equilibrium of power.* All international actors have 'a duty to cooperate to maintain an equilibrium of power' in international society.⁴⁷ A system in which power is accumulated by a unipole will be unstable and antagonistic. The EU needs to rebalance the overwhelming power of the United States without jeopardizing the transatlantic relationship. Greater self-reliance for its own security can square this circle in the light of the fact that, in the long run, the United States is likely to become a Pacific rather than an Atlantic power.
- *Great power responsibility.* While all states must act in ways that strengthen international order, great powers have a special duty to act responsibly by virtue of their superior strength. This means, first and foremost, ensuring that the primary goals of international society are respected and that general wars (and ideological crusades) are avoided. While great powers may have grounds for exempting themselves from the rules, this exceptional conduct requires the assent of the rest of international society.
- *Diplomacy as mediation.* Negotiations must proceed on the basis that our knowledge of other cultures and societies is incomplete. Enlightened diplomacy seeks to enlarge the horizon of mutual understanding without assuming that common interests will be safeguarded by a convergence over values.⁴⁸ Impartiality in third-party disputes is an important principle that the EU ought to consider if it wants to foster compliance with pluralist rules.
- *Institutional adaptation.* When it comes to adapting the institutional architecture of international society, such as membership of the UN Security Council and other important governance directorates, the EU must compromise its substantive values in order to be inclusive towards 'the legitimate interests of rising powers and new member states'.⁴⁹

Privileging pluralist maxims in the formulation of an ethical external policy will appeal to decision-makers in circumstances where values and goals are contested on the outside and where differences emerge between member states on the inside. On such occasions, it must be recognized by those defending pluralist maxims that these are 'second best' and that they owe the citizens of the Union an account of why the unrelenting pursuit of universal values is likely to jeopardize regional and/or international security. In this sense, pluralism will sometimes be a price Europeans should accept to maintain order in an unequal and deeply divided world.

The area in which pluralist thinking has most bearing on EU international public policy is in security and defence policy. Here the debates about self-reliance are apposite.⁵⁰ The primary rules of a pluralist international society cannot be

⁴⁶ Javier Solana, 'A secure Europe in a better world: European Security Strategy', approved by the European Council 12 Dec. 2003, <http://www.iss-eu.org/solana/solanae.pdf>, accessed XX XXXX 2007.

⁴⁷ Linklater and Suganami, *The English School*, p. 238.

⁴⁸ As George Kennan argued in *American diplomacy* (Chicago: IL: University of Chicago Press, 1951).

⁴⁹ Linklater and Suganami, *The English School*, p. 238.

⁵⁰ It was primarily because of the need for greater self-reliance that Bull opposed Duchêne's 'civilian power' doctrine. See Bull, 'Civilian power Europe: a contradiction in terms?', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 22: 1-2, 1982, pp. 149-70.

upheld without a strategic capacity that enables Europe to take a leading role in peace support operations and other preventive military actions where required. Having the capacity to be a force for good in the world will also ensure that Europe is taken more seriously by other Great Powers such as China and the United States, neither of which shares the vision that has driven forward the integration and enlargement process.

The European initiative in the diplomacy of disarmament with Iran illustrates the need to draw on pluralist maxims of good international citizenship. In common with other arms control regimes, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is designed to promote order, to which end it normalizes the injustice of the distinction between the nuclear haves and have-nots. The EU line is consistent with pluralism in that it has offered wider cooperation in return for Iran ending its uranium enrichment programme. How long this diplomatic strategy will be allowed to run before the American government calls 'time' remains an open question.

Conclusion

It is widely agreed that the expansion of the European Union has been its greatest single foreign policy achievement. As enthusiasm for further enlargement wanes, the EU needs to develop an international public policy that relies on instruments other than regime change through the process of accession. The urgency with which this must be done is heightened by the fact that enlargement has brought Europe 'closer to troubled areas'.⁵¹

While the demand for a common European position on foreign and security matters is high, this article has questioned whether the supply of available ideas is fit for purpose. Neither of the historic alternatives provides a satisfactory guide. Realism believes that other-regarding behaviour is always a mask beneath which lies the naked truth of national interests. On this logic, foreign policy will only be 'common' when the interests of the members temporarily coincide. Cosmopolitans, on the other hand, believe in universal values and think that the EU must at all times live up to them. Between the two, I have argued, lies a middle ground where it is possible to recognize that independent political actors are neither animated solely by power politics nor on an irreversible journey towards a post-sovereign universal community.

Recognizing that this middle position covers a broad spectrum of possible forms of moral conduct, the article has sought to tease out the tension between pluralist and solidarist conceptions of good international citizenship. This revealed four important further considerations.⁵² First, there are general principles which both pluralism and solidarism share, such as mutual recognition, fidelity to the rules, cooperation within institutions and a belief that progress (however limited) is possible. Second, even when there is a strong consensus around cosmopolitan

⁵¹ The words are those of Javier Solana. See 'A secure Europe', p. 7.

⁵² I am grateful to Richard Devetak for clarifying these points.

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norms such as the promotion of human rights, it might be appropriate for the EU to fall back on pluralist maxims when strategic considerations come into the frame or when it is felt that collective action might do more harm than good. Third, the selection of these different interpretations of good international citizenship requires a public justification and must be open to critique. Fourth, the selection of maxims is not an abstract exercise; detailed information is required about the alternative courses of action and their implications.

Gareth Evans recently criticized the EU for falling below its potential as an ethical actor in its handling of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. It was, he said, ‘depressing’ to watch ‘the failure of the EU to punch *at* its weight’.⁵³ His concept of good international citizenship, interpreted in the light of the transformation of rights and duties within the Union, illustrates how a future Europe could punch *above* its weight.

⁵³ Gareth Evans, ‘Towards peace in the Middle East: lessons for European policy-makers’, address to the European Parliament, 3 July 2007. Available on the International Crisis Group website, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home>, accessed 10 Sept. 2007.